Consumption is one channel through which the environment is damaged. To protect the environment, various product standards have been introduced across the world. This paper uses a new economic geography framework to explore the effects of environmental product standards on environment in a North-South trade model. We examine the situation in which North unilaterally introduces an environmental product standard. Specifically, those products that do not meet the standard are not allowed to be sold in North's market. We find that such a standard may worsen North's environment but improve South's environment due to firm relocation. 
Introduction
There is growing concern for the environmental destruction of the world. To protect environment, various environmental policies have been adopted. However, attitudes of countries towards environmental destruction differ leading some countries to adopt more stringent policies than others.
Examples of differing environmental regulation include environmental "product" standards (such as auto emission standards) where a government may prohibit firms from selling those products that do not meet the required environmental product standards.
Three examples of these environmental product standards are i) the U.S. Clean Air Act of 1970, called the Muskie Act, that prohibited car manufacturers from selling cars that failed to meet the emission standards, 1 ii) the EU prohibition on the use and import of chrysotile asbestos products in 1998, and iii) the China Compulsory Certification introduced in 2002, under which foreign firms cannot export to China without implementing certain standards.
Environmental policies could affect firm locations. Polluting firms are expected to move to countries with laxer environmental policies. 2 This expectation has been enforced by recent improvements in transportation and communications technology, as well as trade liberalization that allows firms to choose their locations more easily. Similarly, prohibitive environmental product standards may also affect firm locations with firms having little incentive to locate in a country with prohibitive standards. An important point is that firm relocations caused by environmental product standards could affect environment.
In this paper, we analyze the theoretical effects of prohibitive environmental product standards on firm locations and environment. To this end, we adopt a new economic geography (NEG) framework, because firm locations are the central issue in the NEG literature. Because of its simplicity, we specifically employ the so-called footloose capital model developed by Martin and Rogers (1995) . 3 In this model, there are two countries (North and South), two sectors (agriculture and manufacturing), and two factors (capital and labor). The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive, firms produce from labor alone with constant-returns-scale (CRS) technology, and the product is freely traded internationally. The manufactured products are subject to the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type of monopolistic competition, are costly to ship internationally, and damage local environment in the process of consumption. Capital is mobile across countries and determines firm location, though capital owners and labor are not mobile.
North is more concerned about the environment and so unilaterally introduces an environmental product standard. If firms do not comply with it, then they cannot serve North's market. Due to the possibility of firm relocation, those firms producing goods that do not meet North's standard operate in South (due to trade costs) and serve only South's market. Those firms that conform to North's standard by incurring extra costs can serve both markets and locate in either North or South.
Our main finding is that North's environmental product standards may fail to protect North's environment. With the standard implemented, those products that do not meet the standard (henceforth, dirty products) are excluded from consumption in North, but consumption of the other products, i.e., products satisfying the standard (henceforth, clean products) could increase a lot. Unless clean products never damage environment, North's environment could deteriorate as a result. Moreover, South's environment may be improved by North's environmental product standards. We show such paradoxical effects of North's environmental product standards in the presence of firm relocation.
There are many studies that theoretically investigate the relationship between environmental policies and firm locations (Markusen et al. 1993 (Markusen et al. , 1995 Rauscher, 1995) . However, the existing literature mostly deals with "production" externalities in a monopoly or oligopoly model. When "consumption" itself generates negative externalities, environmental product standards are applied.
Relatively little attention has been paid to environmental and trade policies with consumption externalities. In particular, only a few studies analyze environmental product standards in the open economy framework. In an international duopoly model, Fischer and Serra (2000) consider optimal minimum standards and examine whether they are protectionist. Haupt (2000) examines the relationship between environmental product standards and environmental R&D in a monopolistically competitive sector in a two-country model. Toshimitsu (2008) shows that a strict emission standard on imported products may or may not increase social surplus by using model with environmentally differentiated products and heterogeneous consumers. Ishikawa and Okubo (2009) There are only a few NEG studies that examine environmental policies. Pfluger (2001) considers Pigouvian emission taxes in an NEG model. Venables (1999) studies the impact of energy taxes on equilibrium in a vertical linkage model. Elbers and Withagen (2004) explore the impact of an emission tax on labor agglomeration in the presence of labor migration. By using the footloose capital model, Zeng and Zhao (2009) examine pollution haven in the presence of both cross-border and cross-sector externalities. Ishikawa and Okubo (2008) use the footloose capital model to compare tax on emissions and quota policies for controlling greenhouse-gas emissions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our basic model and analyze the initial equilibrium. As an example of environmental product standards, we consider emission standards such as car exhaust emission regulations. In Section 3, the equilibrium under emission standards is explored. In the presence of standards, some firms incur costs to conform to them, but the others do not. In Section 4, some extensions are investigated. Section 5 concludes the paper.
NORTH-SOUTH TRADE MODEL

Basic model with wage gap and factor mobility
We employ the Dixit-Stigliz type of monopolistic competition model with international capital mobility (firm migration) developed by Martin and Rogers (1995) . There are two countries (North and South), two production factors (labor, L, and physical capital, K) and two sectors (agriculture, A-sector, and manufacturing, M-sector). Labor is mobile between sectors but immobile between countries. Capital is mobile across countries, though capital owners are not.
We incorporate the following two features into Martin and Rogers (1995) Turning to the demand side, a representative consumer (in North) has the following quasi-linear utility function:
(1) ( )
where M and A stand for consumption of M-sector varieties and that of A-sector product respectively, and μ is the intensity of preference towards M-sector varieties. n is the number of differentiated varieties. (2000), we assume that the representative consumer ignores the negative externalities when making her consumption decisions.
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Each consumer has one unit of capital as well as one unit of labor and obtains income from both endowments. It should be noted that the quasi-linear utility function eliminates the income effect and hence each consumer buys a certain number of units of M-goods regardless of her income.
While capital is mobile between two countries, capital owners are immobile and hence capital rewards are repatriated to the country of origin. Because capital endowment is initially allocated in proportion to labor endowment (market size), North's share of initial capital and labor endowments are given by Utilizing (2) (3) and (4), the profit for a representative firm in North is given by
where
9 Noting South's wage rate is w * , the profit for a South-based firm is
Long-run equilibrium (without Environmental Policy)
In the long-run equilibrium, capital is freely mobile between countries and the profits are equalized between North and South. The profit equalization determines North's firm shares, 0 n (we let a subscript "0" denote the initial equilibrium):
Then solving (5), we can obtain the long-run equilibrium firm share,
Noting that 
Negative externalities
Negative externalities are generated locally when the M-goods are consumed. Emissions are assumed to affect each consumer's utility as seen in (1) but never negatively affect production in either sector. The quantity consumed by North's (South's) residents for a local good is given by
and that for an imported good is
. It follows that the total emissions in North and South in the initial equilibrium are respectively: This implies that smaller trade costs and a lower wage in South increase North's emissions. Lower consumption prices in North (due to smaller trade costs and lower wage rate in South) increase North's consumption and hence North's emissions.
ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT STANDARDS AND COMPLIANCE COSTS
Compliance costs
Now North's government unilaterally introduces a product standard for emissions caused by consumption. The maximum level of emissions allowed per unit consumption is z (<1), which is called the emission standard level. If a product meets the standard (that is, if a product is a "clean" product), then it can be sold in North's market. However, if it does not meet the standard (that is, if it is a "dirty" product), then it cannot be sold in North. Thus, North-based firms producing dirty products stop their operation in North and relocate to South due to trade costs. South-based firms producing dirty products cannot export their products to North.
In response to North's standard, some firms incur costs to comply with the standard, while the others do not. For simplicity, the number of firms complying with the standard (henceforth C-firms) and firms without compliance (henceforth D-firms) are exogenously given as C N and D N , where
. 12 We assume that a firm's type never changes even if that firm changes its location. The compliance requires additional labor forces per unit of production, therefore the labor coefficient for C-firms, "b", satisfies a b > , while that of D-firms remains to be "a". It follows that "b-a" can be interpreted as the additional units of labor per output required to conform to the standard.
The standard forces D-firms out from North and all D-firms concentrate in South. North bans all imports of D-firm products. In other words, D-firms become local firms in South, which locate and sell only in South. On the other hand, since C-firm products meet the standard, C-firms can locate in either North or South to maximize their own profits and can sell in both markets by incurring trade costs.
Long-run Equilibrium
Now we investigate the long-run equilibrium under the environmental product standard. Capital is mobile and so profits equalize across North and South. Although all D-firms locate in South due to the standard, C-firms are able to choose their location which could be divided between the two countries.
We denote the share of C-firms located in North by "m"
). Since all D-firms locate in South, the firm share in North under the standard (the subscript "1") can be defined as
We note that the number of C-firms is 
Therefore, the total number of firms in North, 1 n , is given by The total emissions in each country are given by 
Policy impact on North's emissions
We compare North's emissions with and without emission standards. Total emissions without the standard are given by (7) and those with the standard are given by 
Why do North's environmental standards increase emissions? Location effect and import embargo effect
An environmental product standard generates two effects which increases emissions. The first is the "location" effect of C-firms in North, which lowers trade-costs and allows higher levels of consumption. When North enforces the regulation, all available varieties in North are only C-firm products, which charge higher prices than in the initial equilibrium due to the compliance costs. As a result, North's market potential increases due to a fall in competition (a fall of ∆). On the other hand, all D-firms locate in South charging lower prices, which causes South's market potential to decrease due to tougher market competition (a rise of ∆*). North can attract more C-firms by the standard. Since the number of domestic C-firms in North increases, North's consumers pay less trade costs and can consume more. Thus, North's emissions increase. This stems from an increase in the number of C-firms in North, which is called the "location" effect.
The second is the "import embargo" effect. The total number of consumed varieties in North declines because of the ban on D-firm products. When the number of available varieties decreases, the consumption of each variety increases, which dominates the decrease in the available varieties with the CES preferences in (1). As a result, more emissions are generated. This is called the "import embargo"
effect. This effect is promoted by smaller σ (more substitution between varieties).
These two effects increase emissions. As South's wage rate or the trade costs fall, more C-firms are attracted to South, which reduces the location effect and decreases emissions. An increase in the number of C-firms, C N , reduces the import embargo effect and can mitigate emissions (see Section 4.2).
EXTENSIONS
This section considers some extensions of our basic model to understand the impacts of environmental product standards more generally.
Global Emissions
In this subsection, we discuss the case of transboundary emissions, those emissions whose externalities are not just local but affect both countries' environments. Our model framework is kept as in Section 3 except that emissions are transboundary. For simplicity, we focus on the case where emissions are completely transboundary and hence the environment deterioration depends on the global emissions which are defined as aggregate of both countries' emissions: 
C-and D-firm ratio
The environmental product standard generates two types of firms. C-firms incur compliance costs, (14):
At extreme, if almost all firms are type C-firms, there is a moderate wage gap and trade costs, then their locations are diversified between North and South.
We now investigate North's emissions with standards (denoted by a subscript "1") and without standards (denoted by a subscript "0") when If the number of C-firms is large enough, i.e., 
Endogenous Firm Type
While our basic model exogenously gives the total numbers of C-firm and D-firm, we now relax this assumption. C N and D N are now endogenously determined so as to equalize both types' profits. It should be noted that no entry and exit is still assumed in the model and hence the total number of firms is always unity (
). Each firm chooses its type but each type has both cost and benefit.
D-firms have lower marginal costs, a, but are required to locate in South, the smaller market, and cannot export to North under environmental product standards. C-firms involve higher marginal costs, b, but can freely choose location and export to the foreign country.
In the long-run equilibrium, C N and m are determined so as to satisfy location condition for 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have explored the effects of environmental product standards on the environment in a
North-South trade model with firm relocation. Specifically, we have examined a case where North unilaterally introduces a product standard under which dirty products (i.e., products not meeting the standard) are not allowed to be sold in North's market. Our model has uncovered a possibility that such environmental product standards worsen North's environment and improve South's environment. In particular, we have found that small compliance costs and lax emission standards tend to generate this paradoxical result. It is expected that as the environmental standard becomes laxer, the costs to comply with the standard become smaller. Thus, no environmental standard is likely to be better than a lax standard from the viewpoint of environmental protection in North. Even when environmental damage is not local but global, North's environmental product standards could worsen global environment.
Our model operates on the basis of monopolistic competition. We do not claim that monopolistic competition is the best market structure for investigating the issue. Our focus is on the environmental effects caused by firm location choices due to environmental product standards. Firm location choices have been extensively studied in the NEG framework which strongly depends on monopolistic competition. Thus, a monopolistically competitive model based on the NEG framework is the natural starting point for analyzing how firm locations affect the environment. However, examination the same issue in alternative market structures is certainly worthwhile. Environmental product standards in our model are very stringent in the sense that those firms that do not conform to the standards relocate to foreign countries. However, governments may be more generous or permissive. In the real world, governments tend to subsidize firms required to make products meet stricter standards. However, our model does not capture this issue. To study the policy from this perspective may require the application of incentive theory with asymmetric information.
APPENDIX 1: FIRM SHARE
We prove 0 1 n m > and 0 1 n n > . , however, we obtain Since the original standards were overly strict, no auto producer was expected to be able to achieve them. Subsequently, the target dates were extended a total of three years and then the law was revised as the Clean Air Act of 1977.
2. Henderson (1996) , Becker and Henderson (2000) , Greenstone (2002) , and List et al. (2003) find that pollution-intensive plants are responding to environmental regulations.
3. The footloose capital model is the simplest model in NEG. See Baldwin et al. (2003) .
4. South's lower wage rates encourage firms to relocate there. Unless North is bigger than South, all firms could locate in South (without any environmental policy) because of South's cost advantage without a demand advantage in North (no agglomeration force).
5. Since S c is the quantity of "North" consumption of a variety produced in South, "*" is not attached. A subscript "S" indicates the production location. 12. We could assume a situation that firm types are randomly allocated with a certain probability. Or more precisely, we suppose that a firm draws a lottery to decide its own firm type before its operation as in Hopenhayn-Melitz approach. We examine the case where firm types are endogenously determined in Section 4.3.
13. See Appendix 1 for proof.
14. We have 
